Robust Imitation Strategies by Sudharshan, Devanathan et al.
W
o
r
k
in
g
 P
a
P
e
r
s
 s
e
s
 
F a c u l t é  d e s  s c i e n c e s  e c o n o m i q u e s  e t  s o c i a l e s
W i r t s c h a F t s -  u n d  s o z i a l W i s s e n s c h a F t l i c h e  F a k u l t ä t
u n i v e r s i t é  d e  F r i b o u r g      |      u n i v e r s i t ä t  F r e i b u r g
 
 
 
ROBUST IMITATION STRATEGIES 
 
D. Sudharshan, Olivier Furrer, & Ramesh A. Arakoni 
 
 
Performance is the lifeblood of a firm’s management. Performance itself depends on the adaptation of 
strategy, based on learning and the environment. An important way that firms adapt their strategy is 
through imitation or mimetic isomorphism. Imitation implies a referent for such adaptations. This article 
seeks to determine who or what should serve as that referent. Accordingly, this research (1) develops a 
broad and rich model of industry dynamics, bringing together literature from industrial economics, 
strategic groups, learning, and resource-based theories; (2) examines the robustness of imitations 
strategies; and (3) develops a framework of the managerial implications of imitative behavior in varying 
industry conditions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Strategic management is fundamentally concerned with environmental changes and 
organizational adaptations (Ansoff, 1979; Hofer and Schendel, 1978). One of the key ways firms 
adapt their strategy is through imitation or mimetic isomorphism. The profound influence of 
imitation on industry dynamics has been well established (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; 
Haveman, 1993; Miner and Raghavan, 1999; Rivkin, 2000). It consists of following a leader (or 
referent; Fiegenbaum, Hart, and Schendel, 1996), though the question of which leader to follow 
has not been satisfactory answered. Industrial organization (IO) economics suggests that firms 
should imitate the strategy of the firm that leads the overall industry in terms of its performance. 
Strategic group theory recognizes mobility barriers between groups and thus suggests that firms 
should follow the strategy of a leading firm in their strategic group. In contrast, the resource-
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based theory posits that a firm should imitate the leading firm from among those with similar 
resources (i.e., its resource group), but only if it does not have unique resources to distinguish 
itself from competitors. Considering these three distinctive recommendations, we seek to answer 
the following question: Is there a robust imitation strategy for firms seeking to improve their 
performance? By robust, we mean a strategy that most often leads to leadership across various 
environmental conditions. If the answer to this question is not a clear yes (as our findings 
indicate), is there a most robust strategy for each of a variety of environmental conditions? To 
answer these questions, we adopt a simulation methodology (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 
2007; Harrison, Lin, Carroll, and Carley, 2007) to determine the performance implications of 
following the industry leader, a strategic group leader, or a resource group leader. Through these 
simulations, we can identify the most robust imitation strategy for a firm to follow, which results 
in it becoming a performance leader, given a certain level of uncertainty in its external  
environment (environmental turbulence) and uncertainty about the value and inimitability of its 
resources. 
Furthermore, we develop a resource–strategy–performance (R–S–P) framework to model 
both the magnitude and the direction of change in the strategy of an imitating firm. Our 
framework while similar to the one proposed by Kunc and Morecroft’s (2010) contends that the 
relationship between resource development and performance is mediated by a firm’s strategic 
positioning in the industry environment. Kunc and Morecroft laid out a decision making process 
describing the relationship between firm performance, resource conceptualization, and resource 
development. The inclusion of strategy positioning helps us to account for various environmental 
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conditions1. In our simulation, the R–S–P framework helps reveal the effect of pursuing 
alternative imitation strategies. That is, with a model based on this framework, we can compute a 
firm’s performance as a function of its position and the density of competition it faces in the 
strategy space. An imitating firm’s strategy change moves in the direction of a referent, and its 
extent is a function of its change capability (which in turn is a function of its resource stock at the 
time of the change). To complete the cycle, a firm’s resources increase or decrease as a function 
of its past performance. Thus we can answer the question of which referent to follow by varying 
the parameters of the model to simulate different environmental conditions and then comparing 
the resulting performance under the three different imitation strategies. We contribute to extant 
literature by (1) developing a broad, rich model of industry dynamics that brings together 
literature from IO economics, strategic groups, learning, and resource-based theories; (2) 
identifying robust imitation strategies; and (3) recommending managerial guidelines for imitative 
behavior in varying industry conditions. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Competitive imitation lies at the core of strategy theory.2 Both Schumpeter (1950) and Nelson 
and Winter (1982) note the central roles of innovation and imitation in dynamic competition. 
Ghemawat (1999: 84) defines imitation as “the diffusion of successful business models—defined 
1  IDC a major strategy consulting firm provides several examples of what they term as MarketScapes. Each 
MarketScape represents vendors (participants) in an industry. What is fascinating is that they collapse several 
measures of strategy onto a Strategies dimension and several measures of capabilities onto a Capabilities 
dimension. Each vendor is represented as a circle on these dimensions with its center representing their 
respective Strategies and Capabilities scores and its size its market share. Remarkably, in the examples provided 
on the IDC website, shares of vendors along the diagonal are in general higher than those located off-diagonal, 
thus anecdotally confirming the relationship between performance and the match between strategies and 
resources. Further, both from the MarketScape diagrams and the associated write-up, it is clear that each market 
is segmented thus justifying the need to model strategy and resource groups. 
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this language. 
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in terms of resources, deployed and/or activities performed—across the population of firms.” 
Other scholarly works emphasize the use and value of imitation as a strategy, such as DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983), Porter (1985), Haveman (1993), Rivkin, (2000), and Lieberman and Asaba 
(2006) (see Miner and Raghavan, 1999, for a review). Ghemawat (1986) provides evidence of the 
pervasiveness of imitation across cross-sections of industries, which likely stems from the cost 
and information advantages it offers (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). In general, innovators tend to 
bear higher costs (e.g., Porter, 1985) and face more uncertain environments than imitators (e.g., 
Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Thus, imitation is both less costly and less risky as a 
strategy, compared with innovation. 
When a competitor develops a technological innovation that establishes a new offering, the 
question of whom to imitate may be moot. However, if there are multiple innovators, varying 
slightly in degree and nature, identifying the correct referent may not be straightforward. For 
example, should a competitor have imitated Sony’s Betamax or JVC’s VHS technologies? This 
example also reveals a key point, namely, that it is easier to think in terms of imitating 
technologies (Betamax versus VHS) than imitating broader strategic moves. For strategic issues 
such as changes in scale, scope, or synergy, the question of whom to imitate grows even murkier. 
Imagine a hypothetical choice between imitating GE’s strategic scope versus that of Rolls Royce. 
In the context of such broad strategic moves, both uncertainty and ambiguity increase—a 
condition that creates powerful drivers of imitation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and managers 
tend to use role models and examples (Denrell, 2003; Gavetti, Levinthal, and Rivkin, 2005). Also 
in these conditions, imitating the wrong firm may have serious negative consequences (Denrell, 
2005; Gavetti and Rivkin, 2005). So, the question of whom to imitate is of great importance. 
Prior literature provides a wealth of responses: The best firm to imitated is variously 
identified as the best performer (Ghemawat, 1999; Rivkin, 2000); a representative of the herd 
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(Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1998; Lieberman and Asaba, 2006); the one with the best 
routines for the market conditions (Nelson and Winter, 1982); the one perceived to be more 
legitimate or successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Lieberman and Asaba, 2006); a better-
performing rival (Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Miner and Raghavan, 1999; Zott, 2003); the one 
with successful strategies (Porter, 1985); or the most innovative firms or first movers 
(Schumpeter, 1950). Thus, even when imitation is recognized as a core element of strategy 
practice and theory, vast possibilities for selecting a role model or referent exist, and the issue of 
whom to imitate remains problematic. As Haveman (1993: 596) observes, “Although imitation 
has long been recognized as a sensible guide to organizational change … there has been little 
theoretical analysis to determine which social actors will be imitated,” and we might add, little 
theoretical analysis to determine which social actors should be imitated. 
To begin to address this gap, we note that the list of possible referents begs a question about 
the reference group that produces the referent. For example, IO theory stipulates that in less 
turbulent environments, firms should imitate their industry leader, such that the industry itself is 
the reference group (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Ghemawat, 1986). Strategic group 
theorists instead argue that imitating the industry leader does not lead to higher performance, so 
firms should follow the leader of their strategic group (e.g., Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1995). 
From a resource-based viewpoint, firms should differentiate themselves from others (Barney, 
1991), though if they do not possess distinctive capabilities, they should follow leading firms 
with comparable resources (Mehra and Floyd, 1998), which implies the reference group is the set 
of firms with similar resources (Mehra, 1994) (i.e., their resource group). In summary, three 
streams of literature provide conflicting recommendations about whom to imitate—with little 
guidance about varying conditions. Our proposed stylized model (the R–S–P model) therefore 
captures elements of all three streams of research to shed more light on this question. 
5. 
3. THE R–S–P MODEL 
Because our objective is to compare alternative referents (i.e., resource-based, strategy-based, or 
industry-based) that a firm might imitate, our model must allow for representations of the firm’s 
resources and strategy, as well as of their dynamic relationships with performance as the firm 
adapts through its imitation. Therefore, our model, building on Kunc and Morecroft’s (2010) 
framework, comprises the following relationships: (1) performance as a function of resources and 
strategy, (2) change in strategy as a function of the position of the referent, (3) the extent of 
strategy change as a function of a firm’s resource position, and (4) resource change as a function 
of dynamic capabilities and performance. 
3.1 Representation of strategy and resource 
Early strategy literature (Ansoff, 1979; Hofer and Schendel, 1978) explained firm performance 
on the basis of either a firm’s strategy position or resource endowments. The two factors are 
interrelated; it would not be possible to enact strategy without resources, nor would it be possible 
to acquire additional resources without enacting strategy. However, in strategy literature, these 
two spaces traditionally have been separated (Wernerfelt, 1984). To be consistent, as well as to 
distinctly and clearly model and observe the underlying dynamic interaction among resources, 
strategy, and performance, we separate them in our model as well. 
Competitive firms thus appear positioned in two multidimensional spaces. In the strategy 
space, firms are identified on the basis of their strategy, whereas in the resource space, the same 
firms are identified on the basis of their resources (Furrer et al., 2008). Multiple dimensions can 
define the strategy space, as noted by McGee and Thomas (1986) and Thomas and Venkatraman 
(1988). Early studies used strategy variables to conceptualize strategic groups; more recent works 
group firms according to their resource positions (Bogner, Thomas, and McGee, 1996; Mehra, 
1996). Tang and Liou (2010) propose the use of Bayesian inference to identify industry specific 
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resource configurations, which mediate sources of competitive advantage and sustainable 
superior performance. These resource configurations correspond to the dimensions of the 
resource space. A similar inference process can be used to identify the dimensions of the strategy 
space. It could also be used to update priors on the state of the industry. Tang and Liou (2010) 
identify three key resource configurations or resource space dimensions in the semiconductor 
industry: relationship advantage, management ability, and knowledge management. Similarly, the 
strategy space dimensions might for example entail operating efficiency and capital leverage. 
Both operating efficiency and capital leverage are derived from scale, scope, and synergy and 
thus relate back to the conventionally defined view of corporate strategic choices (Ansoff, 1979). 
3.2 A model of firm performance 
Modeling performance as a function of the firm’s strategic position is a well-established tradition. 
For example, Levinthal (1997), Ghemawat (1999), and Gavetti et al. (2005) represent a strategy–
performance map as a high-dimensional performance landscape, such that locations in strategy 
space relate directly to performance. In addition, following Rivkin (2000), we model a firm’s 
performance as a function of the distance between its actual position in the strategy space and the 
optimal position (which depends on the nature of the industry). In competitive environments, a 
firm’s performance is not based solely on its own strategy (Porter, 1985); rather, as population 
ecology literature (Hannan and Freeman, 1977) and positioning literature (Hotelling, 1929; 
Porter, 1985) indicate, we assume that when firms are closer to each other, their respective 
performance suffers. Thus, we model firm performance as directly proportional with its closeness 
to the optimum (Rivkin, 2000) and inversely proportional with the closeness of other firms to that 
optimum (Kuehn and Day, 1962; Shocker and Srinivasan, 1974, Sudharshan, May, and Shocker, 
1987). 
However, the number and location of such optima is not clearly defined. According to 
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strategic groups literature (e.g., Hatten and Schendel, 1977), an industry has several optimal 
points, one for each group. The appropriate grouping of firms to explain their performance might 
reflect the commonality of their strategies (McGee and Thomas, 1986) or the commonality of 
their resources (Mehra 1994). If performance is based on strategic groups, the number of optima 
equals the number of strategic groups present, with one optimum for each group. Similarly, if 
performance is based on resource groups, the number of optima is the number of resource groups 
present, with one optimum for each group. But IO theory (Scherer and Ross, 1990) instead calls 
for one unique, optimal position, or industry optimum, such that proximity to it leads to superior 
performance in the industry. 
More formally, firm f’s performance Pf can be specified as in Equation 1, where the 
numerator is the inverse of the weighted (w) distance between the firm’s position in strategy 
space (s) and the relevant optimum (opt), and the denominator is the sum of the inverses of the 
distances of all firms from the appropriate optimum. This follows the tradition in the marketing 
literature of following the pioneering work of Kuehn and Day (1962) and Shocker and Srinivasan 
(1974). We provide a detailed summary of the notation in Table 1. 
  (1) 
3.3 Change in strategy 
Assuming that managers are organizationally rational, they select and implement strategies that 
they believe will lead to higher performance (Simon, 1976). Strategy change then represents an 
outcome jointly determined by the motivation to change, opportunity to change, and capability to 
change (Greve, 1998; Miller and Chen, 1994). A firm’s strategy change is not fixed in magnitude 
or direction over time; rather the magnitudes and directions likely vary at different times 
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(Burgelman, 1994; Zajac, Kraatz, and Bresser, 2000). Cognitive strategic group theory (Porac et 
al., 1995; Reger and Huff, 1993) and reference-point theory (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1995; 
Fiegenbaum et al., 1996) suggest that managers use referents to evaluate their relative strategic 
position and the direction to move to improve their performance. Observing competitors provides 
firms with an opportunity to see how similar firms, often endowed with comparable resources, go 
about addressing opportunities and problems that are similar to those that they face (Peteraf and 
Shanley, 1997). 
In our model, a firm adjusts its strategy in accordance with observed industry behavior and a 
reference point. Each adjustment requires a choice of both the direction and the magnitude of 
change. To achieve or protect its desired position in strategy space, a firm needs to deploy 
resources (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Peteraf, 1993); thus resources constrain the change that can 
be made to the strategy. In turn, we model strategy change as it occurs in the multidimensional 
strategy space, in each time period, in the direction of a referent, and with a maximum 
magnitude, given available resources and not exceeding the amount needed to close the gap with 
the referent. We present the formal relationships of strategy change, resources, and performance 
gaps after we detail how resources constrain strategy change. 
3.4 Resource constraints on strategy change 
To achieve its desired position in strategy space, a firm must deploy resources. Many of the 
enablers of and constraints on strategy changes arise from meta- or dynamic capabilities (Collis, 
1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997) and core rigidities 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992). To modify its strategy, a firm needs to reconfigure its resource structure 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and develop or acquire new resources (Makadok, 2001). 
At any given time, a firm’s ability to change a strategy dimension is limited by its resources 
and dynamic capabilities. Following the principle of Occam’s Razor, we model this assertion 
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with a multiplicative conversion factor that translates resources into strategy change. In principle, 
conversion factors depend on a firm’s dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997). It is also possible 
that firms are idiosyncratic in choosing how much of their resources they wish to spend on the 
various dimensions of strategy, as captured through a multiplicative maximum utilization factor. 
More formally, we specify the change in firm f’s strategy (∆s) on dimension j in Equation 2, 
which provides the maximum change possible, and Equations 3 and 4, which reveal the 
constraints that limit this change. Associated with each resource group k is a factor wk,i,j that 
scales the resource value of firm f on resource dimension i to change on strategy dimension j 
without further constraints. Utilization factor utilk,i,j constrains the amount of change possible 
through the use of resource dimension i on resource dimension j. 
  (2) 
Furthermore, to ensure that a firm’s actual change (∆sactual,f,i) is no more than needed to attain best 
performance (Simon, 1976), we apply the following additional condition: 
  (3) 
where ∆sf,i is the difference between the optimal strategy and the fth firm’s strategy. 
3.5 Resource changes 
Resources may change through utilization, erosion, or substitution (Collis, 1994; Makadok, 2001; 
Sirmon, Hitt, and Ireland, 2007), so a firm must continually develop its resources (Kunc and 
Morecroft, 2010) and as resources get used, it needs to replenish its stocks by reinvesting part of 
its performance in resources (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). The extent of resource change affected 
by the use of a unit of performance depends on the firm’s dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 
1997) and resource configuration (Tang and Liou, 2010). In each time period, the firm’s 
resources get updated, with the subtraction of the extent to which they were used in the past 
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(erosion is not explicitly modeled) and the addition of a proportionality factor of performance. 
Therefore, the governing equation for the conversion of resource i into strategy, accounting for 
the actual use of resources, is:  
  (4) 
where qf,i is a measure of how much of resource i is used. 
Not all available resources necessarily are used to implement strategy change (Tang and Liou, 
2010); the amount of change needed may have been less than the amount of change possible with 
the resources available (Penrose, 1959). A ratio of needed strategy change to the maximum 
possible strategy change provides an indicator of the proportion of usable resources actually used. 
Recalling that ∆sf,i is the difference between the optimal strategy and the fth firms’ strategy, and 
∆smax,f,i is the maximum possible change allowed, we denote 
  (5) 
which implies that Σj utilr,i,j ≤ 1; otherwise, firms will use more resources than they actually have, 
which is not a valid condition. 
We performed a simulation study using these relationships. For the simulation, the model 
based on the R–S–P framework was programmed in C++. When possible, we set parameters 
suggested by prior literature (Repenning, 2002) or empirical evidence (Oliva and Sterman, 2001). 
For other parameters that rely on scale values that are likely specific to industries, we instead 
carried out a sensitivity analysis to find a range of values that produces useful scenarios as 
recommended by Davis, Eisenhardt and Bingham (2007). Sudharshan, May and Shocker (1987) 
also provide insights into parameter selection for simulations representing spatial competition. 
With a generic set of scales, we could assume that an appropriate scale transformation is possible 
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between the generic scale values we use and the empirically derived values that can be measured. 
For example, without loss of generality, interval scales are invariant up to a + bx (where x is the 
variable, and a and b are transformational parameters); ratio scales are invariant up to an ax 
rescaling. With these scale invariance conditions, our results become generalizable. 
4. MODEL PARAMETERIZATION 
To study the effects of resources and strategy on a firm’s performance and the robustness of its 
imitation strategies, we first ran a parametric study to identify acceptable ranges for different 
parameters (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2007; Law and Kelton, 2000). We sought to 
identify the primary effects of the group parameter on performance, its variance among different 
firms, and the number of time-steps required to reach a steady state. Then, we examined the 
effect of perturbations of the optimal point on the dynamics of the industry. Given the nature of 
the adaptation model, there is a chance that some parameter values will result in cases in which 
the performance of all firms is very close, such that they nearly converge. If this convergence 
were to occur in just a few time periods, it would imply that the parameter values used are not 
very interesting, in that they would not correspond with the reality in most competitive markets 
that show sustained performance differences across firms (Schmalensee, 1985). Therefore we 
carefully chose the parameter values, as we describe in detail subsequently. We also determined 
acceptable ranges for the parameters to use in our main simulation study. 
4.1 Setting values for p_rk,i, r_sk,i,j, and utilk,i,j  
A firm in a resource group is characterized by two parameters: (1) p_rk,i, which converts the 
performance of a firm belonging to resource group k into resource on the ith dimension of 
resource space, and (2) r_sk,i,j, which converts the resource on the ith dimension of the resource 
space of a firm belonging to resource group r into the strategy on the jth dimension of strategy 
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space. A third parameter to parameterize is utilk,i,j, which is the maximum proportion of resources 
that can be converted into strategy. Firms are allocated to strategic groups on the basis of the 
closeness of their initial positions in strategy space, so strategic groups have no specific 
parameters. 
In turn, p_rk,i provides the principal feedback to the system by governing the replenishment of 
the firm’s resources. It describes the amount of resources a firm obtains per unit of performance. 
We made this parameter non-dimensional by dividing it by the order of magnitude of the 
resources. To facilitate the comparison of the effects of p_rk,i across different simulations, when 
varying the range of resources, we normalized it as follows: p_r’k,i = p_rk,i/rmax,i. In the 
simulations, rmax,i is taken to be 10 (i.e., the maximum of the magnitude used for simulation), 
without loss of generality. It is important to identify an acceptable range for p_r’k,i because a 
higher value of p_r’k,i ensures that firms do not exhaust their resources too quickly. 
A high value of the normalized performance-to-resource feedback parameter (p_r) ensures 
that firms do not exhaust their resources too quickly. For the same unit of performance, more 
resources are created for higher normalized performance-to-resource feedback parameter firms. 
With higher resources, the tendency of each firm is to adopt the currently targeted optimal 
strategy in fewer time steps, which leads it to miss out on (overshoot) nearby optimal strategy 
points that may be better. In other words, there is less time for learning. 
If all firms face similar conditions, then an optimal value of p_r’k,i exists that minimizes the 
disparity between the firms and the time needed to reach a steady or quasi-steady state. Because 
the objective for all firms is improved performance, we chose the condition in which the change 
in the standard deviation of firm performance was close to 0 (zero), which implies that in the 
industry, there may be performance differences across firms, but the overall performance 
variation does not change much from one time period to another. This state is the converged 
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state, and the time taken to reach it is t_conv. 
In most industries, convergence only occurs after a sufficient period of time (Miner and 
Raghavan, 1999). It is therefore important to identify a range for p_r’k,i for which convergence is 
not achieved too quickly. The simulation results in Figure 1 show that at low values of p_r’k,i 
(i.e., < 0.1), there is no effect on t_conv. However at values greater than 0.1, the time taken to 
converge decreases with the increase in p_r’k,i. The results in Figure 2 show that a p_r’k,i value 
between 0.2 and 0.3 gives the lowest standard deviation of performance of firms at t_conv when 
firms follow their resource group or strategic group leaders. This trend changes when firms move 
toward the optimal points or the overall group leaders though. These results are valid when the 
optimal point(s) is fixed and there is no perturbation in the system—constraints that we later 
relax. With these results, and because rmax,i has been fixed at 10, the range for p_r’k,i is between 
0.1 and 0.2 (i.e., p_rk,i is between 1 and 2), to denote the range that leads to sufficient 
performance differences across firms for a sufficient period of time. 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
Next, to determine an acceptable range for r_s k,i,j that transforms resources into strategy, we 
consider the cost involved in changing the strategy used by a firm. A lower value of r_sk,i,j 
implies that more resources have to be used to effect a unit of change in strategy, compared with 
the case for a higher r_sk,i,j. To normalize r_sk,i,j, we compute r_s’k,i,j = r_sk,i,j· smax,j/rmax,i and 
thereby compare different simulations. If both smax,j and rmax,i are equal, this normalization is not 
required. In the current scenario, the smax,j/rmax,i ratio is held constant, though that is not always 
the case. The costs for changing a strategy are not necessarily linear, which would be reflected in 
r_sk,i,j. When r_sk,i,j is constant, its effects parallel that of p_rk,i. For example, doubling the value 
of r_sk,i,j is equivalent to doubling the value of p_rk,i. 
We also defined a range for utilk,i,j, the maximum percentage of resources that can be 
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converted into strategy. For the sake of simplification, we set the utilk,i,j matrix to be symmetric 
with the off-diagonal terms equal to 0 (in line with Suh’s [1990] design axiom). Thus the 
resource coordinate i serves to change only the strategy coordinates i. 
The simulation results in Figure 3 show the effect of utili,i on t_conv. A higher value of utili,i 
reduces the time taken to converge only when firms try to adopt a strategy of directly targeting 
the optimal point (s_cond = 1). For all the other strategies, the time taken to converge reduces up 
to a utili,i of about 0.4. Figure 4 shows the effect of utili,i on the standard deviation of performance 
at t_conv. When firms adopt the strategy of targeting the optimal point (s_cond = 1), the standard 
deviation of performance at t_conv is nearly constant and is not affected by the utili,i. For the 
other strategies, no effect can be observed. 
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
From these results and to meet our criteria of sufficient interfirm performance difference over 
a sufficient period of time, we fixed the range for utili,i between 0.2 and 0.5 and the range for 
r_sk,i,j between 0.2 and 0.75. 
4.2 Effect of optimal point perturbations 
Finally, we tested the effect of optimal point perturbations. Previously, optimal points have been 
assumed to be fixed across time, but environments are often dynamic (Sirmon et al., 2007), so we 
relax this constraint and rerun the simulations with random perturbations added to the optimal 
point(s) at every time period. Even the smallest perturbations ensure that no steady state is 
possible and that no single firm can remain a leader forever, as the number of leadership changes 
in Figure 5 show. The perturbations depicted in the figure were randomly chosen, and the 
maximum amplitude allowed is a percentage of smax,j. When the perturbation is greater than 2 
percent, the system becomes chaotic. In such a situation with ample perturbations in the position 
of the optimal point(s), there is a large number of changes in leadership and firm performance, 
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leading the imitation of a prior leader to lead to unpredictable outcomes. Thus, in the main 
simulation, we set the value of the perturbation parameter at 1 percent to provide sufficient but 
not excessive variation (Law and Kelton, 1991). 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
This parameterization study also helps establish the face validity of this study, in that our 
system behaved as would be expected. 
5. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
Which imitation strategy is the most robust? As we define it, it is the one that most often leads to 
leadership across various environments (i.e., environmental turbulence and perturbation in the 
position of the optimum and uncertainty about the value and inimitability of its resources). 
Should firms follow their resource group or strategic group leaders? Or, should they follow the 
industry’s overall best performer? To answer these questions, we ran a series of simulations in 
which different imitation strategies (s_cond) were adopted by firms from different groups. The 
simulations used the following parameter values and ranges: total firms = 30; number of resource 
groups = 10; number of strategy groups = 153 (we ensured the number of resource groups was 
different from the number of strategy groups to facilitate the investigation of the effects of 
grouping by resource versus strategy). These values are consistent with the findings of previous 
studies on strategic and resource groups, which suggest 4 to 6 groups in industries with between 
12 and 43 firms (Bogner et al., 1996; Cool and Schendel. 1987, 1988; Fiegenbaum et al., 1990; 
3 There is considerable debate about the most appropriate clustering methodology and how to specify cluster cut-offs 
for each methodology; this is about the number of strategic group and firms change membership over time (e.g., 
Bogner et al., 1996; Cool and Dierickx, 1993). To avoid adding more complications, in terms of changing clustering 
methodologies and the number of groups over time, we focused specifically on the effect of the imitation strategy 
chosen. 
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Hatten and Schendel, 1977; Mehra. 1996). The number of time steps is fixed at 20, to provide a 
sufficient period of observation. The resource group parameters were the same for all groups. The 
performance-to-resource parameter p_rk,i was either 1 or 2 (i.e., p_r’ = 0.1 or 0.2). The resource-
to-strategy parameters r_sr,i,j were 
 
0.75 0
0 0.2
 
 
 
 
 
  and 
 
0.2 0
0 0.75
 
 
 
 
 
 , the utilization parameters utilr,i,j 
were 
 
0.5 0
0 0.2
 
 
 
 
 
  and 
 
0.2 0
0 0.5
 
 
 
 
 
 , and the performance weighting factors were 
 
1.0 1.0[ ] (no 
preference for any strategy coordinates, both weighted equally when calculating performance). 
Each simulation was run five times, with the results averaged. A summary of the parameter 
values appears in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
In Tables 2 and 3, we present the results when the optimal points are fixed. Table 2 shows the 
results when firms belonging to the same resource group follow the same strategy: Firms in 
resource group 1 follow their resource group leader, firms in resource group 2 follow their 
strategic group leader, and firms in resource group 3 follow the industry overall leader. Table 3 
presents the results when firms belonging to the same strategic group have the same strategy: 
Firms in strategy group 1 follow their resource group leader, firms in strategy group 2 follow 
their strategic group leader, and firms in resource groups 3 and 4 follow the industry overall 
leader. The next two tables present the results when the optimal point is perturbed with a 
maximum amplitude of 1 percent. Table 4 refers to the case in which firms belonging to the same 
resource group follow the same strategy, and Table 5 details the results when firms belonging to 
the same strategic group have the same strategy. 
[Insert Tables 2 to 5 about here] 
The simulation results show that when there is no perturbation and the firms in a resource 
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group have similar strategies, it is better for them to follow the industry leader if there is an 
optimal point for each resource group (76.7 percent chance of becoming leader) or when there is 
a single optimal point for the entire industry (57.9 percent chance of becoming leader). It is better 
to follow the strategic group leader when there is an optimal point for each strategic group though 
(55.9 percent chance of becoming leader). When there is no perturbation and the firms in a 
strategic group have similar strategies, it is better for them to follow the industry leader in any 
case. When the optimal point is perturbed, and firms belonging to the same resource group follow 
the same strategy, firms are better off following the strategic group leader when there is an 
optimal point for each resource group (42.8 percent chance of becoming leader) or when there is 
a optimal point for each strategic group (57.6 percent chance of becoming leader). Yet it is better 
to follow the industry overall leader when there is a single optimal point for the entire industry 
(66.8 percent chance of becoming leader). In a perturbed environment and when firms belonging 
to the same strategic group follow the same strategy, firms are better off following the industry 
overall leader when there is an optimal point for each resource group (54.1 percent chance of 
becoming leader) or when there is a single optimal point for the entire industry (75.8 percent 
chance of becoming leader). It is however better to follow the strategic group leader when there is 
an optimal point for each strategic group (59.2 percent chance of becoming leader). 
In a turbulent environment, managers choose which referent to imitate using two types of 
information: their worldview (or mental model; Adner and Helfat, 2003; Kunc and Morecroft, 
2010) and the observed behavior of the firms in their reference group. The strategic positioning 
of a firm relative to other firms and their positioning relative to the optimal point(s) for the 
industry dictate its performance. This process is elaborated as follows: First, managers have (or 
choose) a worldview. Due to internal and external causal ambiguity, managers do not a priori 
know the location of the optimal point (King, 2007; Kunc and Morecroft, 2010). They infer the 
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location of this point based on their performance and the performance of other firms (Tang and 
Liou, 2010). Which firms they use as referent depends on their worldview, which is the mental 
representation or knowledge structure they have about the relationships between resource, 
strategy, and performance. This mental representation includes the reference group with which 
they identify (Figenbaum, Hart, and Schendel, 1996). According to prior literature, managers 
may adopt one of four different worldviews: (1) their strategic group, (2) their resource group, (3) 
their industry as a whole, or (4) a flexible worldview, which allows them to identify each 
reference group and choose the most relevant one based on the situation. Second, managers need 
to observe the behavior of the firms in their reference group, and the result of these observations 
is conditioned by their worldview. Managers with a worldview based on resource groups can 
observe if firms in the same resource group follow the same imitation strategy. However, if firms 
in the same strategic group follow the same imitation strategy, for example, managers will not be 
able to observe or identify any pattern of behavior. Only managers with flexible worldviews can 
recognize all the different patterns of behavior and choose the correct referent for imitation. 
Third, after conducting their worldview-shaped observations and analysis, managers choose the 
leader to imitate: resource group or industry leader if they have a resource group worldview, 
strategic group or industry leader if they have a strategic group worldview, industry leaders when 
the managers have an industry worldview, and any of the three leaders when they adopt a flexible 
worldview. A firm’s performance (i.e., the likelihood that the firm will become an industry 
leader) then is a function of the manager’s strategic choice and the strategic choices of all 
competitors, together with the location of the optimal point(s). An industry might feature an 
optimal point for each resource group, for each strategic group, or only one optimal point for the 
entire industry. Figure 6 depicts the firm’s decision tree, as well as the resulting likelihoods of 
becoming an industry leader according to the results in Tables 4 and 5. From this stylized 
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decision process, we derive seven key findings pertaining to our simulation results. 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
Finding 1: Knowledge of the state of the industry allows firms to choose the best strategy. 
We fine large differences in the percentage of chances of becoming the industry leader across 
states of the industry, ranging from 0 to 33.3 percent. Firms that are able to identify (know) the 
state of an industry have higher likelihood of becoming an industry leader than those that do not 
know it. 
Finding 2: When the state of the industry is known and the industry is homogeneous (i.e., 
there is a single optimum for the entire industry), firms should follow the industry leader. 
When there is only one optimum for the entire industry, following the leader is always the 
best strategy. On average, there is a 12.2 percent likelihood of becoming the industry leader, 
whereas the likelihood is only 5.0 percent when choosing another strategy (p = 0.03). 
Finding 3: When the state of the industry is known to be fragmented into strategy groups 
such that each strategy group has an optimal point, firms should follow their strategic group 
leader. 
When the state of the industry is known and the industry is fragmented, with an optimal point 
for each strategy group, there is an 18.0 percent likelihood of becoming the industry leader if the 
firm follows the strategic group leader, compared to 4.8 percent when choosing another strategy 
(p = 0.002). 
Finding 4: When the state of the industry is known and it is fragmented into resource groups 
such that each resource group has an optimal point, firms should differentiate (i.e., not follow 
the same type of leaders as other firms). 
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In this state of the industry, firms that follow the resource group leader have a 9.7 percent 
average likelihood of becoming industry leader; that likelihood is only 7.5 percent when they 
choose another strategy (p = 0.09). 
Finding 5: Approaching the question of choosing the correct referent with a flexible 
worldview allows firms to increase their chances of becoming an industry leader. 
Because, there are vast differences in the likelihoods of becoming the industry leader across 
fixed and flexible worldviews, firms with a flexible worldview are able to differentiate more 
accurately among different strategic alternatives and thus increase their chance of becoming 
industry leader. 
Finding 6: Firms with a fixed worldview and no knowledge about the state of the industry 
should follow the industry leader. 
Assuming that a firm does not have knowledge about the state of the industry, which we take 
to be equivalent to assuming that all the states have equal probabilities, following the industry 
leader is the most robust strategy. There is one exception to this finding though: when managers 
have a strategic group worldview, they have higher chance to become industry leader by 
following their strategic group leader. However, in three out of four situations, when firms are 
able to differentiate more accurately among different strategic alternatives (because of their 
flexible worldview), they enjoy higher likelihoods of becoming industry leaders. 
Finding 7: Firms with a flexible worldview and no knowledge about the state of the industry 
should follow their strategic group leader. 
Following the strategic group leader is the most robust strategy when the states of the industry 
have equal probabilities of occurrence. In all such situations, following the strategic group leaders 
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produces equal or higher likelihoods of becoming the industry leader. 
6. DISCUSSION 
If firms had perfect information, they would perhaps make perfect decisions. It is only when they 
do not have a source of perfect information (because of the non-existence, cost, or some other 
reason) that they are likely to resort to inferences to adapt their strategies (Tang and Liou, 2010). 
Imitation of referents is one such coping and adaptation behavior. In this work, we have 
developed a model of how firms choose the referent group to imitate and adapt their strategies 
based on their observations of the behavior of their respective referent groups. We provide a 
formal representation of the dynamics of an industry in which resources get converted into 
strategic choices, which in turn deliver firm performance, depending on the environment of the 
industry and the extent of differentiation and concentration among constituent firms. A firm’s 
performance provides the wherewithal for its resource changes, and then the cycle repeats. Firms 
may choose among referent groups: (1) their strategic group, (2) their resource group, or (3) their 
industry as a whole. If a firm chooses to observe only one referent group, it exhibits a fixed 
worldview. Some firms also may have a flexible worldview, such that they consider each 
reference group and choose the most relevant one based on the situation. This approach is in 
effect a fourth type of referent, namely, the flexible referent. Because information/observation 
may be costly or perhaps due to managerial cognitive biases, firms may choose a specific referent 
group’s behaviors to observe and imitate. An industry might be characterized by the existence of 
an optimal point for each resource group, for each strategic group, or only one optimal point for 
the entire industry. A firm’s objective, to become the leader, then is a function of the manager’s 
strategic choice and the choices of all competitors with respect to the location of optimal point(s). 
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6.1 Theoretical contribution 
Our simulation model is consistent with work by Powell (2003; Powell and Lloyd, 2005), who 
measures performance in terms of wins, equivalent to the results we present in Tables 2–5. There 
are some differences though. First, we do not have local optima (rugged landscape). Second, we 
have moving as opposed to fixed ones. We also add model complexity in two different ways; 
local optima could be added easily to our model in the future. Moreover, our results are 
consistent with those of Gavetti et al. (2005), who show that Analogizers are better than Local 
Searchers in a novel and complex landscape (environment). However, Gavetti et al. (2005) and 
Gavetti and Rivkin (2005) do not provide specific guidelines for managers to identify a good 
referent. With this study, we propose and test the performance of three types of referents (best 
performer in the resource group, strategic group, or entire industry). Our results are also 
consistent with Denrell’s (2005) emphasis on the dangers of benchmarking (i.e., following the 
wrong leader). 
Along the same vein as the studies by Kunc and Morecroft (2010) and Tang and Liou (2010), 
this paper also extends the resource-based view by arguing that the mere possession of valuable, 
rare, non imitable, and non substitutable resources (Barney, 1991) is not sufficient to ensure 
sustainable superior performance. Whereas, Tang and Liou (2010) demonstrate that is resources 
configurations that leads to superior performance, not single independent resources, Kunc and 
Morecroft (2010) argue that these resource configurations should not only be conceptualized, but 
should also be developed over time and implemented. Our study extends this work by showing 
that the conceptualization and development of resources should be contingent with environmental 
conditions. In addition, consistent with these study, our behavioral framework contend that 
managers are only boundedly rational and that in the face of causal ambiguity there is no 
assurance that they choose the right referent and develop the right resources and implement the 
23. 
right strategy. 
6.2 Managerial implications 
As an example that might help in thinking of how our study translates into the world of practice 
consider the recent performance of J.C. Penney & Co. (JCP) in the U.S. Department store 
industry. Walmart is the clear industry leader in the industry and has held its leadership 
consistently over time. The industry is grouped in terms of strategies pursed by its participants. A 
new CEO, Mr. Ron Johnson, was installed in February 2012 to counter threats from Macy’s and 
Kohl’s in JCP’s strategy group and loss of market share. He disastrously pursued everyday low 
pricing—a key strategy of the industry leader. JCP’s same store sales fell 20.3 percent in the first 
half of fiscal year 2013. JCP brought back Mr. Myron Ullman, who had been replaced by Mr. 
Johnson, as its CEO. Mr. Ullman has brought back sales promotions as a key component of 
JCP’s strategy. In this instance of a market fragmented by strategy, following the industry leader 
was disastrous. 
Another example may be seen in the European airline industry. Every European major airline 
is seeking to develop strategies for responding to competition from low-cost airlines (Jarach, 
2004). However, every initiative to imitate low-cost airlines, such as EasyJet and Ryanair, seems 
likely to fail due to differences in resource group memberships. For example, Air France’s low 
cost subsidiaries are constrained to a large extent in their options by union pressures and cost 
structure. Following a leader of a different resource group—low cost airlines—when resource 
groups matter seems to be unwise. 
Our results also fit a contingency theory viewpoint; the contingencies and their appropriate 
strategies constitute a result of our analysis. The findings from our simulations suggest several 
managerial recommendations, which we present in Figure 7 in the form of a 2 × 2 matrix that 
24. 
consists of firms’ worldview (fixed or flexible) and firms’ knowledge about the state of the 
industry (known or unknown). Thus we detail four robust imitation strategies. 
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
Firms with a fixed worldview (i.e., fixed referent) and no knowledge of the state of the 
industry should follow the industry leader; firms with a flexible worldview (i.e., flexible referent) 
and no knowledge of the state of the industry should follow their strategic group leader. In 
addition, firms with a fixed worldview and knowledge of the state of the industry should follow 
the industry leader if the industry is homogenous, their strategic group leader if optimal points are 
based on strategic grouping, or differentiate if optimal points are based on resource grouping. 
Finally, firms with a flexible worldview and knowledge of the state of the industry should follow 
the industry leader if the industry is homogenous, follow their strategic group leader if optimal 
points are based on strategic grouping, or differentiate if optimal points are based on resource 
grouping. 
6.3 Limitations and future research 
Our paper has some limitations as does any simulation study (Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 
2007; Harrison, Lin, Carroll, and Carley, 2007). In our simulations, we captured the basic 
dynamics of the R–S–P model in the form of the effect of the group parameters on the overall 
industry. Accordingly, we studied the effects of perturbations on leadership changes and overall 
dynamics in the industry; how the factor converting performance into resources on the outcome 
affected the overall leaders (the parameter played an important role, depending on the strategy 
condition adopted by firms); and, when different groups adopted different strategy conditions, the 
ideal strategy conditions that lead to overall leadership. However, the effects of non-constant 
parameters such as the one converting resource to strategy need further investigation. We held 
them constant in our simulations, both in strategy space and time. This approach could be 
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changed to reflect changes in cost over time or a spatially varying cost. The sensitivity analysis of 
the effect of the other parameters on the outcomes also needs to be studied, as should the effects 
of inter-coupling of parameters. Future studies using behavior simulation (per Kunc and 
Morecroft, 2010) or Bayesian inference (per Tang and Liou, 2010) might be useful to identify 
values for key parameters and assess the external validity of our framework. Future simulation 
research could involve varying many more components of our model, including the objective 
function(s). A fruitful study would also allow for the Bayesian updating of the ideal point 
estimates (i.e., more generally response surface estimates by industry participants). Developing 
methodologies for estimating response surfaces from natural experiments would be very 
promising as these are more applicable for practice in our disciplines than in-petri 
experimentation. Lab (or in-petri) experiments with controlled studies would also be very helpful 
to understand specific learning models and strategic thinking models that might provide 
additional knowledge or refinements to incorporate into mathematical models of industry change. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The R–S–P model provides a basis for empirical implementation as part of a decision support 
system, because it details the parameters (variables) and functional forms to be calibrated 
(measured) for a particular industry and its constituents. We believe that empirical examinations 
of industries using our model will not only lead to a better understanding of industry dynamics 
but also encourage methodological developments for estimating the functional forms of resource 
to strategy conversion, strategy to performance conversion, and performance to resource 
conversion. Firms using the recommendations derived from our model thus could focus on 
innovations that might change the competitive space, as well as the relationships among 
resources, strategy, and performance, which would enhance their competitive advantage. 
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Table 1. Nomenclature and simulation parameter values 
Parameter Name Parametric Studies Leadership Studies 
N Number of firms 10 30 
ngR Number of resource groups 2 or 3 10 
ngS Number of strategic groups 3 15 
time Number of time-steps to which the 
simulation is carried out 50 20 
tconv Time step at which the firms are said to 
have converged 
Change in the standard deviation 
of firm performance close to zero 
Change in the standard deviation 
of firm performance close to zero 
grf Resource group to which the fth firm 
belongs Assigned based on initial location Assigned based on initial location 
gsf Strategy group to which the fth firm 
belongs Initially based on starting location Initially based on starting location 
optp,i ith strategy coordinate of the pth optimal 
point 
Fixed or random perturbations 
(1%–20%) 
Fixed or random perturbations 
(1%) 
Pf,t Performance of fth firm at time t — — 
Prms,t Standard deviation of performance of firms 
at time t — — 
ref_cond Performance calculation conditions 1 (optima by resource group), 2 
(optima by strategic group), 3 
(optima by industry) 
1 (optima by resource group), 2 
(optima by strategic group), 3 
(optima by industry) 
s_cond  Strategy followed conditions 1 (target optimal point), 2 (target 
resource group leader), 3 (target 
strategic group leader) or 4 (target 
industry leader) 
1 (target optimal point), 2 (target 
resource group leader), 3 (target 
strategic group leader) or 4 (target 
industry leader) 
rf,i ith coordinate of the fth firm in the resource 
space 
Initially drawn from a uniform 
random with mean (5.5) 
Initially drawn from a uniform 
random with mean (5.5) 
rmax,i Order of magnitude of the resources in a 
simulation 10 10 
∆sf,i Absolute difference in i
th coordinates of a 
firm’s strategy and the optimal point — — 
∆smax,f,i Maximum change of i
th strategy coordinate 
possible with current resources — — 
∆sactual,f,i Actual change of i
th strategy coordinate — — 
qf,i Factor of how much of resource i is used ≤ 1 ≤ 1 
sf,i ith coordinate of the fth firm in the strategy 
space 
Initially drawn from a uniform 
random with mean (5.5) 
Initially drawn from a uniform 
random with mean (5.5) 
wk,i Weight of the ith strategy coordinate in 
determining performance of a firm belong 
to the kth resource group 
1.0 1.0 
usef,i Amount of ith resource coordinate used to 
convert to strategy 
— — 
p_rk,i Factor for converting performance to ith 
resource dimension for resource group k [0.0; 10] 1 or 2 
p_r’k,i  Normalized p_rk,i. Normalized by dividing 
with rmax,i 
[0.0; 1.0] 0.1 or 0.2 
utilk,i,j Maximum fraction of ri that can be used to 
convert to sj for the kth resource group 
[0.0; 1.0] 0.2 or 0.5 
r_sk,i,j Factor for converting ith resource 
coordinate to jth strategy coordinate for the 
kth resource group 
[0.0; 10.0] 2 or 7.5 
r_s’k,i,j Normalized r_sk,i,j. Normalized by 
multiplying by smax,j/rmax,i 
[0.0; 1.0] 0.2 or 0.75 
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Table 2. Results for overall leader when there is no perturbation in the environment (firms 
in the same resource group follow the same strategy) 
Scenario (ref_cond) Strategy (s_cond) Percentage likelihood of firms becoming industry 
leaders 
1. Optimal point for each RG 2. follow the RG leader 23.0 
 3. follow the SG leader 0.3 
 4. follow the industry leader 76.7 
2. Optimal point for each SG 2. follow the RG leader 7.2 
 3. follow the SG leader 55.9 
 4. follow the industry leader 36.9 
3. Single optimal point for the 2. follow the RG leader 8.0 
  entire industry 3. follow the SG leader 34.2 
 4. follow the industry leader 57.9 
Notes: RG = resource group, SG = strategic group. 
 
Table 3. Results for overall leader when there is no perturbation in the environment (firms 
in the same strategic group follow the same strategy) 
Scenario (ref_cond) Strategy (s_cond) Percentage likelihood of firms becoming industry 
leaders 
1. Optimal point for each RG 2. follow the RG leader 48.5 
 3. follow the SG leader 0.0 
 4. follow the industry leader 51.5 
2. Optimal point for each SG 2. follow the RG leader 4.2 
 3. follow the SG leader 20.0 
 4. follow the industry leader 75.8 
3. Single optimal point for the 2. follow the RG leader 23.7 
  entire industry 3. follow the SG leader 0.1 
 4. follow the industry leader 76.2 
Notes: RG = resource group, SG = strategic group. 
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Table 4. Results for overall leader when there is perturbation in the environment (1%) 
(firms in the same resource group follow the same strategy) 
Scenario (ref_cond) Strategy (s_cond) Percentage likelihood of firms becoming 
industry leaders 
1. Optimal point for each RG 2. follow the RG leader 16.0 
 3. follow the SG leader 42.8 
 4. follow the industry leader 41.2 
2. Optimal point for each SG 2. follow the RG leader 26.8 
 3. follow the SG leader 57.6 
 4. follow the industry leader 15.6 
3. Single optimal point for the 2. follow the RG leader 2.0 
  entire industry 3. follow the SG leader 31.1 
 4. follow the industry leader 66.8 
Notes: RG = resource group, SG = strategic group. 
 
Table 5. Results for overall leader when there is perturbation in the environment (1%) 
(firms in the same strategic group follow the same strategy) 
Scenario (ref_cond) Strategy (s_cond) Percentage likelihood of firms becoming 
industry leaders 
1. Optimal point for each RG 2. follow the RG leader 39.1 
 3. follow the SG leader 6.8 
 4. follow the industry leader 54.1 
2. Optimal point for each SG 2. follow the RG leader 1.2 
 3. follow the SG leader 59.2 
 4. follow the industry leader 39.6 
3. Single optimal point for the 2. follow the RG leader 23.4 
  entire industry 3. follow the SG leader 0.8 
 4. follow the industry leader 75.8 
Notes: RG = resource group, SG = strategic group. 
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Figure 1. Effect of p_r’r,i on t_conv as a function of ref_cond(r) and s_cond(s) 
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Figure 2. Effect of p_r’r,i on standard deviation of performance at t_conv as a function 
of ref_cond(r) and s_cond(s) 
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Figure 3. Effect of utili,i on t_conv as a function of ref_cond(r) and s_cond(s) 
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Figure 4. Effect of utili,i on standard deviation of performance at t_conv as a function of 
ref_cond(r) and s_cond(s) 
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Figure 5. Effect of perturbation on the number of leadership changes 
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Abstract
Performance is the lifeblood of a firm's management. Performance itself depends on the adaptation of
strategy, based on learning and the environment. An important way that firms adapt their strategy is
through imitation or mimetic isomorphism. Imitation implies a referent for such adaptations. This article
seeks to determine who or what should serve as that referent. Accordingly, this research (1) develops a
broad and rich model of industry dynamics, bringing together literature from industrial economics,
strategic groups, learning, and resource-based theories; (2) examines the robustness of imitations
strategies; and (3) develops a framework of the managerial implications of imitative behavior in varying
industry conditions.
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